

AD-A116 160

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE. (U)
APR 82 M C WILLIS

F/G 15/3

UNCLASSIFIED

NL


END

DATE

RECEIVED

8 82

DTIC



AD A116160

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. AD-A116160	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Civil Emergency Preparedness: An Organizational Perspective		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Student Essay
7. AUTHOR(s) LTC Mary C. Willis		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Same		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. REPORT DATE 16 April 1982
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 37
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) <p>→ An organizational history of civil emergency preparedness and response activity. Author describes the many various organizations dealing with this subject from World War II to the present time, and concludes with a detailed analysis of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). ↗</p>		

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 68 IS OBSOLETE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS:
AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

BY

MARY C. WILLIS
LTC, AG

CLASS OF 1982

RESEARCH ESSAY

16 APRIL 1982



Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A	

Approved for public release
distribution unlimited.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	1
WORLD WAR II TO 1957	2
THE REORGANIZATION OF 1958	5
THE REORGANIZATION OF 1961	7
THE 1973 DECISION AND THE 1970'S	11
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY	17
APPENDIX I	24
APPENDIX II	25
APPENDIX III	26
APPENDIX IV	29
END NOTES	33
BIBLIOGRAPHY	36

CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS:
AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

INTRODUCTION

"Conceptually, there are three major components of the total civil emergency preparedness and response activity:

(1) War related measures (or national security measures) such as civil defense, continuity of government, and resource management measures -- the latter including industrial mobilization, material stockpiling and economic stabilization planning.

(2) Disaster preparedness and response measures related mainly to natural disasters.

(3) An intermediate category of civil emergency preparedness and response measures, not necessarily related to either wartime contingencies or to natural disasters, but related to man-made situations such as threats or acts of terrorism, peacetime nuclear emergencies, or critical shortages or disruption of essential resources or services such as petroleum, electricity, or transportation."¹

The charter of the current Federal agency charged with civil emergency preparedness, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is contained in Executive Order 12148:

The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall establish Federal policies for, and coordinate, all civil defense and civil emergency planning, mitigation, and assistance functions of Executive Agencies.

The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) shall determine national preparedness goals and policies for the performance of functions under this Order and coordinate the performance of such functions with the total national preparedness programs.²

In order to assess FEMA's capability to carry out its mandate, it is necessary to examine the missions and capabilities of the organizations which preceded FEMA's creation.

World War II to 1957

World War II stimulated considerable interest in creating a permanent emergency planning agency to deal with industrial and economic mobilization on a continuing basis. The Office of Civil Defense, established in 1941, fulfilled that need until it was disestablished in 1945. Under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) was established, reporting directly to the President. The functions of the NSRB were to advise the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization, including such facets as effective use in time of war of manpower and materiel, stabilization of the civilian economy in time of war, establishing reserves of strategic and critical materials, strategic relocation of industries and other facilities, and continuity of government. The Chairman of the Board was appointed by the President and was charged to utilize to the maximum extent the facilities and resources of the departments and agencies of the Government.³

After abolishment of the Office of Civil Defense in 1945, the civil defense planning function was transferred to the Army; in 1947 the function was assumed by the Secretary of Defense with the establishment of the Office of Civil Defense Planning. In 1949, President Truman transferred responsibility for

civil defense planning to the NSRB. The enactment of the Federal Defense Act of 1950 established the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) as an independent agency by statute. The intent of Congress was "to provide a plan for the protection of life and property in the United States from attack and invest responsibility for civil defense in the States and their political subdivisions."⁴ The Administrator of the FCDA was given the authority to delegate specific responsibilities to various Federal agencies. Civil defense was defined as all "activities and measures undertaken (1) to minimize the effects upon the civilian population caused by an attack upon the United States, (2) to deal with immediate emergency conditions caused by an attack and (3) to effect emergency restoration of vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by an attack."⁵ The FCDA remained a separate agency until 1958.

The NSRB, created as a planning agency, was not designed to carry out the operational responsibilities required by United States involvement in the Korean War. In late 1950, the President created the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) in the Executive Office. Throughout the war the Director of Defense Mobilization directed, controlled and coordinated mobilization activities of the Executive Branch, including production, procurement, manpower, stabilization and transport. The execution of these important functions by the ODM left the status and role of the NSRB unclear. In 1953, the President submitted Reorganization Plan No. 1 to Congress. The Plan created a new ODM within the Executive Office and transferred to it all the functions of the ad hoc ODM and those exercised by the NSRB. The new ODM also assumed the responsibilities for stockpiling contained in the Strategic and Critical Stock Piling Act of 1946. The Director of the new ODM became a member of the National Security Council.⁶ By the mid-1950's, centralized in ODM was responsibility for the coordination of

all major Federal civil emergency preparedness programs except civil defense.⁷

The division of civil defense and other emergency preparedness responsibilities was not a clear one between ODM and the FCDA and by 1957 both the Congress and the President were proposing changes to correct the overlapping of responsibilities and provide a clear legislative mandate concerning responsibility for civil defense and other emergency preparedness responsibilities. In 1957, the Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations proposed a new Civil Defense Bill for the establishment of a new executive department, in place of the FCDA, to be known as the Department of Civil Defense. The new department would be headed by a secretary and have Cabinet status, thus recognizing the importance of civil defense to the Nation. The proposed new Civil Defense Bill also provided for an expanded role of the Federal government in civil defense matters; one which had not been recognized by the Civil Defense Act of 1950 that gave the impetus to the States and local units of government. The new department would be responsible for a national plan of civil defense and the execution of such a plan. It would also assume from ODM responsibility for such civil defense matters as location of government buildings and post-attack restoration of essential industry.⁸

About the time the proposal was being submitted for the establishment of the Department of Civil Defense, the Bureau of the Budget contracted with a management consultant firm, McKinsey and Company, to study the whole problem of nonmilitary defense in the United States. The study concluded, among other things, that:

Federal responsibility for nonmilitary defense cannot be divided effectively for organizational purposes

Nonmilitary readiness is so vital, and the emergency actions so significant, that continuous Presidential action is required

Existing Federal, State and local governmental machinery must contribute the basic structure to manage available resources and provide essential services following an attack

An organization is needed to assist the President in discharge of nonmilitary defense functions

A staff agency for this purpose should remain in the Executive Office of the President. This agency should concentrate on planning and coordinating nonmilitary defense preparedness measures that would, by Presidential delegation, be carried out by established departments and agencies of the Government.

The director of the key coordinating agency, relieved of the burden of supervising operating functions, would be in a position to assume his proper role as principal⁹ advisor on the readiness of the nation's nonmilitary defenses.

The report concluded that:

in most areas of nonmilitary defense planning, confusion or duplication exists among the organizations involved in that planning... In total, this Nation lacks the organizational arrangements needed for developing a consistent, well-defined program for surviving and recovering from a massive nuclear attack.¹⁰

The McKinsey study also investigated the alternatives of locating responsibility for nonmilitary defense planning within the Executive Office of the President or a separate department, as had been proposed by the House Committee on Government Operations. The final recommendation was that the Executive Office alternative was appropriate for resolving the recognized "organizational deficiencies."

Acting on the recommendations of the McKinsey Report, President Eisenhower submitted Reorganizational Plan No. 1 of 1958 to the Congress.¹¹

The Reorganization of 1958

The Reorganization Plan in essence provided for: (1) the transfer of all ODM and FCDA functions to the President, (2) the consolidation of the ODM and FCDA to form the Office of Defense and Civil Mobilization (ODCM) in the Office of

the President, (3) empowered the President to delegate functions, (4) transferred membership on the National Security Council from the Director, ODM to the new Director, ODCM.¹² It achieved a single source for guidance, assistance and direction in the field of nonmilitary defense and provided to the President the organizational flexibility necessary for meeting changing conditions.¹³ A significant follow-on decision by the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations provided for the inclusion of funds to finance functions delegated to other agencies in the appropriation for operating expenses of the Office of Defense and Civil Mobilization.¹⁴ As originally proposed by the House Committee on Government Operations, the Federal Defense Act of 1950 was amended by Public Law 85-606 to reflect "the policy and intent of Congress that the responsibility for civil defense...be vested jointly in the Federal Government and the several States and their political subdivisions."¹⁵

While the Reorganization Plan of 1958 seemed to provide the needed answers for a viable and cohesive civil defense and civil preparedness program, the Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations was not so convinced. In the subcommittee's view, "the plan should be considered as a trial effort by the President in a complex and difficult area of Federal activity. The responsibility is placed squarely on his shoulders."¹⁶ The subcommittee stated there were several important things to watch for:

- (1) Will the transfer of authority under the plan be real or nominal, as far as the President's personal supervision is concerned?
- (2) Will this plan cause a breakdown of the organizational base for civil defense and dispersal of these functions by delegation even more widely than they are now dispersed?

- (3) Will the new Office of Defense and Civil Mobilization, acting for the President, be able to ride herd on government agencies performing delegated functions and to bring about concerted effort and systematic progress?
- (4) Will the Executive Office of the President be able to accommodate "operating" and field functions?¹⁷

The Reorganization of 1961

As early as January 1961, the issues posed by the Military Operations Subcommittee were also of concern to the new President. Upon appointment of a new Director of OCDM* on January 23, he stated, "OCDM as presently constituted is charged with the staff function of mobilization planning and, at the same time, with the operating functions of civil defense. I consider it imperative that they be organized and performed with maximum effectiveness."¹⁸ Further, he asked the new director and the Director of the Budget to conduct a "thoroughgoing review of nonmilitary defense and mobilization programs,"¹⁹ in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate officials. The upshot of this review was the once again transfer of the civil defense function, this time to the Secretary of Defense. Other changes announced by the President were the reconstitution of OCDM as a small staff agency to assist in the coordination of these functions and an unofficial change in title for OCDM to Office of Emergency Planning. Executive Order 10952, issued on July 20, 1961, officially reassigned the civil defense function to the Secretary of Defense. However, some important aspects relating to civil defense were retained by OCDM. These were:

- (1) advise and assist the President in:
 - (a) determining policy for, planning, directing and coordinating, including the obtaining of information from all departments and agencies, the total civil defense program;

* The name had been changed from Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization to the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

- (b) reviewing and coordinating the civil defense activities of Federal departments and agencies with each other and the activities of the States and neighboring countries.
 - (c) determining the appropriate civil defense roles of Federal departments and agencies, and enlisting State, local and private participation, mobilizing national support, evaluating progress of programs, and preparing reports on civil defense for Congress;
 - (d) encouraging interstate civil defense compacts and reciprocal civil defense legislation; and
 - (e) assisting states in arranging mutual civil defense aid between States and neighboring countries.
- (2) develop plans, conduct programs and coordinate preparations for the continuity of Federal, State and local governments in the event of attack.²⁰

The Secretary of Defense's responsibilities included the development and execution of a fallout shelter program, a chemical biological and radiological defense program, a national warning and communications system, emergency assistance to State and local governments in a post attack period, protection and emergency operational capability of State and local governments for continuity of government, programs for making financial contributions to the State for civil defense purposes, and plans and systems for a nationwide post attack assessment.²¹ The President retained responsibility for medical and food stockpiles. Disaster assistance remained with OCDM. The Agency's name was changed by statute to Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) on September 22, 1961.²² It is interesting to note that OEP also had responsibility for the direction of programs under the Defense Production Act of 1950 and for determining the kinds and quantities of strategic and critical materials to be stockpiled for emergency use. The statute also made the Director of OEP a member of the National Security Council.

During the 1960s the Office of Emergency Planning executed its responsibili-

ties for civil emergency preparedness with some success. In 1963-1964, OEP issued the National Plan for Emergency Preparedness, followed by an example state plan for the emergency management of resources. In June 1964, the President approved the concept of an emergency Office of Defense Resources, to manage federal resource programs in a serious national emergency. Also in 1963/64 OEP acquitted itself well in the coordination of assistance for the victims of Hurricane Hilda and the Alaskan earthquake. Throughout this period of time national preparedness planning became a concerted interdepartmental program within the Federal Government. In a series of executive orders from 1962-1968, departments and agencies were instructed to develop preparedness plans and programs. In 1969, Executive Order 11490 was promulgated, consolidating into one document the specific emergency preparedness function of the various departments and agencies of the Federal Government. Meanwhile, the title of the Office of Emergency Planning was changed by statute, in 1968, to the Office of Emergency Preparedness.²³

The change in name for OEP was not based on Presidential whim but in fact depicted the changing role of the Office. The Director was instructed to give highest priority to a revitalized National Security Council (NSC) system and a broadened disaster assistance program. In 1970, the Office received responsibility for policy direction, coordination and surveillance of the oil import program and chaired an interagency Oil Policy Committee, which led to involvement in all aspects of domestic energy problems. Problems of overlapping responsibilities with the civil defense and other emergency preparedness programs led to adjustments in OEP's regional structure. This resulted in the establishment of 10 regions that had common boundaries with a number of agencies engaged in programs requiring intergovernmental cooperation. Additionally, in 1971, OEP

became the central instrument to administer the 90-day wage-price freeze under the policy guidance of the Cost of Living Council. In making his report to the President in 1973, concerning his service as the Director of OEP, George Lincoln stated that "In the face of these urgent demands and of budgetary and manpower stringencies, traditional civil emergency tasks could not be given as much attention as would be ideal."²⁴

During the period that civil emergency preparedness enjoyed considerable forward movement, civil defense was pursuing a rocky road within the Department of Defense. Initially, President Kennedy gave much verbal support to the program and the Berlin Crisis added the necessary emphasis. Throughout 1961 and most of 1962 Congressional support provided the funds necessary for a national shelter survey program. However the Crisis had little long-term value in terms of civil defense. Some in Congress still argued that civil defense was primarily a State and local program; the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 did little to change that perception. During the Johnson years smaller and smaller amounts for civil defense were approved by McNamara's office for OCD submission to Congress. "The OCD began to speak in terms of "shelf" programs which could, if needed, be called upon -- provided there would be enough time."²⁵ During the Nixon years funds for state and local programs increased while funds for shelter programs decreased. A low point in government commitment toward civil defense came when civil defense functions were transferred to Department of the Army. A National Security Council study completed by OEP provided the impetus for a reorganization of OCD. On May 5, 1972, OCD was officially disestablished and its functions transferred to the new created Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA), again within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.²⁶

From 1970 to 1972 several studies were undertaken to examine the relationship between OEP and OCD, particularly at State and local levels, in dealing with disaster preparedness, and to determine how the size of the Executive Office of the President could be reduced.

The 1973 Decision and the 1970's

Early in 1973 the President announced that OEP would be abolished. His rationale was contained in Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973 -- "OEP's work as a coordinating and supervising authority in this field (emergency preparedness) has been so effective...that the line departments and agencies which in the past have shared in the performance of the various preparedness functions now possess the capability to assume full responsibility for those functions."²⁷ All responsibilities having to do with preparedness for and relief of civil emergencies and disasters were transferred to the Department of Housing and Urban Development to provide for coordination of Federal disaster assistance with that provided by States and local communities. The General Services Administration (GSA) assumed responsibility for measures to ensure the continuity of civil government operations in the event of a major military attack as well as responsibility for resource mobilization and management of the national security stockpiles. Chairmanship of the Oil Policy Committee was transferred to the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury; functions involving the investigation of imports which might threaten to impair the national security went to the Department of the Treasury.²⁸ For the first time in over 20 years there was no official charge with broad civil emergency preparedness responsibilities either within the Executive Office of the President or as a member of the National Security Council. This also meant that all three of the major agencies concerned with civil emergency preparedness maintained their own separate regional offices.

Thus, State officials were required to deal with at least three sets of Federal regional officials on often closely related substantive program issues.

During the ensuing years an Office of Preparedness was established in GSA, and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA) was established in HUD, to carry out the functions transferred from OEP. The Office of Preparedness was later renamed the Federal Preparedness Agency.

In 1977, the Joint Committee on Defense Production concluded an extensive review of the nation's varied emergency preparedness programs. The Committee's report concluded that Federal agencies had not been able to support the States demand for emergency and disaster services; that the diffusion of the Federal preparedness effort through at least 25 departments and agencies had had a negative effect on State and local government preparedness roles; that the lack of a central coordinating authority for the Federal preparedness effort had led to the emergence of scores of interagency coordination and problem solving groups, without any appreciable improvement in preparedness measures and programs at the Federal level; and that 1973 reorganization had left Federal emergency programs without adequate visibility, without access to decisionmakers and without access to central budget and program planning.²⁹

The Committee report recommended that the emergency preparedness functions of DCPA, FDAA and FPA be combined into a single agency, the Federal Preparedness Administration. It would assign to the Director of the new Federal Preparedness Administration authority and budget control for the specific preparedness programs of other departments and agencies as were assigned to the former Director of Office of Emergency Preparedness. The committee further recommended that

the Director of the Federal Preparedness Administration be reestablished as a statutory member of the National Security Council. The committee envisioned the new agency's responsibilities would include programs or plans relating to natural disasters, nonnuclear industrial disasters, economic crisis planning, sabotage and terrorism, peacetime nuclear accidents, civil defense, U.S. assistance for international disaster relief, and strategic stockpiles, as well as overall coordination and long range planning authority for economic mobilization for defense purposes.³⁰

Either in response to the joint committee's report or because of his personal concern relative to the status of emergency preparedness functions within the Federal Government, President Carter directed the Office of Management and Budget to conduct a comprehensive study of the Federal Government's role in preparing for and responding to natural, accidental and wartime civil disasters. The requested study, completed in February of 1978, concluded that:

- (1) the capability of potential adversaries to inflict casualties on the United States has grown phenomenally during the past three decades, but these changes have not been accompanied by a growth in attention to war-related civil emergency preparedness measures.
- (2) preparedness for other kinds of civil emergencies (e.g., peacetime nuclear incidents, terrorism and economic disruptions) is of growing concern.
- (3) over the past decade, particularly, public attention to and Congressional support for, assistance to victims of major natural disasters have increased significantly.³¹

The study went on to state that the various organizational constructs for emergency preparedness functions during the past 30 years proved to have a nominal effect on the visibility of and progress achieved in the various emergency

preparedness programs. The study farther concluded that, "it is very probable that there is no ideal organizational solution at the Federal level for dealing with preparedness for and response to the full range of nonmilitary crises, emergencies, and disasters that could occur in the next decade."³² This last conclusion, notwithstanding, the study went on to suggest some fundamental principles or guidelines to be considered in developing an organizational structure to administer emergency preparedness functions. These were:

- (1) The agency charged with economic mobilization and other civil emergency preparedness functions should be a civilian agency, because these are civil government responsibilities even though they affect both civil and military needs.
- (2) Responsibility at the Federal level for civil emergency preparedness and response should be centralized in a single agency, for administrative efficiency, to avoid duplication, to encourage dual use of available resources, and to promote better coordinated planning and programming.
- (3) The central Federal agency should have a very close relationship to the President, because the functions involved are sufficiently vital that they should command the President's attention. Furthermore, they cut across the functional roles of most Federal agencies, and involve extensive cooperation with State and local governments at the highest levels.
- (4) The single, central agency should seek to avoid involvement in operational functions.
- (5) The agency should be designed to address centralized Federal planning for a wide range and diversity of crises and emergencies.
- (6) The concept of shared responsibility in our Federal system requires that Federal and State emergency preparedness and response organizations be compatible.³³

On June 19, 1978, President Carter submitted to Congress Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978 which provided for the extensive realignment and consolidation of Federal emergency preparedness functions. The purpose of the Plan was

to cut duplicative administrative costs and strengthen the ability of the Federal Government to deal effectively with emergencies. Key elements of the Plan included the unification of key emergency management and assistance functions to provide for direct accountability to the President and Congress, and the establishment of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, whose Director would report directly to the President. To be transferred to the new agency were the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration (Commerce), the Federal Insurance Administration (HUD), oversight responsibility for the Federal Emergency Broadcast System, all authorities and functions delegated to the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD)*, all authorities and functions under the Disaster Relief Acts of 1970 and 1974, and all Presidential authorities and functions delegated to the Federal Preparedness Agency, including the establishment of policy for the national stockpile. Other transfers of emergency preparedness and mitigation functions completed the consolidation: oversight of the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program; coordination of Federal activities to promote dam safety; responsibility for assistance to communities in the development of readiness plans for severe weather-related emergencies, including floods, hurricanes, and tornadoes; coordination of natural and nuclear disaster warning systems; and coordination of preparedness and planning to reduce the consequences of major terrorist incidents. The executive branch retained responsibility for reacting to terrorist incidents themselves.³⁴

President Carter's reorganization plan rested on four fundamental principles:

- (1) Federal authorities to anticipate, prepare for and respond to major civil emergencies should be supervised by one official responsible to the President and given attention by other officials at the highest levels.

* Because of the importance of civil defense to the Nation's overall strategic policy, the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council were to retain responsibility for the oversight of civil defense related programs.

- (2) An effective civil defense system requires the most efficient use of all available emergency resources.
- (3) Whenever possible, emergency responsibilities should be extensions of the regular missions of Federal agencies.
- (4) Federal hazard mitigation should be closely linked with emergency preparedness and response functions.³⁵

Essentially, the President accepted in toto the guidelines offered in the OMB study.

The Reorganization Plan provided for a Director, Deputy Director and four Associate Directors to be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. Ten regional directorships were also established with the director being appointed by the Agency Director. To give FEMA visibility and clout, the Plan called for a Federal Emergency Management Committee chaired by the Director of FEMA, with its membership comprised of the Assistants to the President for National Security, Domestic Affairs and Policy and Intergovernmental Relations, and the Director of OMB. In his message to Congress, the President indicated that the Committee would advise him "on ways to meet national civil emergencies," and on "alternative approaches to improve performance and avoid excessive costs," as well as "oversee and provide guidance on the management of all Federal emergency authorities."³⁶ The activation of FEMA was accomplished in two steps. First, Executive Order 12127, issued March 31, 1979, activated FEMA; second, Executive Order 12148, July 20, 1979, provided for the final consolidation of the various functions.

The challenge which faces FEMA is a serious one. The organizational instability of the past 30 years has had dire consequences for civil emergency preparedness in the United States. Initial surveys, evaluations, and analyses conducted by independent research corporations for FEMA made the following comments

relative to Federal emergency preparedness in the strategic wartime arena:

Industrial Mobilization Planning: atrophied almost completely over the past 15 or 20 years.³⁷

Industrial Mobilization Capabilities: possibly the best proof that there has been no industrial mobilization planning lies in the fact that there is no current body of available information to indicate with high confidence what our national mobilization capabilities are.³⁸

Federal Emergency Preparedness Planning Guidance: clearly, federal preparedness planning has been an important occupation for only a few dedicated people within the federal bureaucracy, and has...lacked any high-level focus. The almost complete lack of funding is, per se, the best indicator of top level indifference to the overall problem area.³⁹

The organizational issues which have been and are still a challenge to FEMA's ability to achieve real progress in the civil emergency preparedness planning arena are many; unity of command, unity of effort, appropriate division of labor, clear lines of authority, resource availability, coordination, control, mission and role clarification, and efficiency. How FEMA has dealt with these issues and how some of them continue to impact on FEMA's ability to successfully execute its mandate will be discussed.

Federal Emergency Management Agency

The first initiative taken by the new Agency was to attempt physical consolidation of the emergency preparedness effort. In July 1979, parts of the Agency were spread throughout the Washington, D.C. area and the country. Moreover, some of the functions were housed within the physical area of agencies to which they previously belonged. Not until September of this year was the consolidation process culminated, with most of the functional elements collocated in a single building. The only exception is the National Emergency Training Center located at Emmitsburg, Maryland. The Center is comprised of the old Staff College,

previously located at Battle Creek, Michigan, and the US Fire Academy. The new center contains the Emergency Management Institute as well as the Fire Academy. The lengthy period of time involved in the consolidation process has had an inhibiting effect on the Agency's ability to quickly achieve a unity of command.

Equally as challenging as the physical consolidation effort has been FEMA's capability to meld the inherited functional parts of the Agency into a cohesive and integrated organization operationally. When the Agency was initially established, the functional elements brought in from the previous parent agencies were kept in tact. The results were unclear lines of authority, the resentment or previously autonomous heads of functional areas and a division of labor that was not supportive of FEMA's umbrella charter.

Under new leadership appointed by the Reagan Administration, the Agency was reorganized in September 1981. Obvious benefits of the reorganization are an enhanced span of control and division of labor. Appendices I and II contain the old and new organization charts, respectively. Operating entities now focus on the four major functional responsibilities of the Agency: (1) national preparedness, (2) State and local programs support, (3) mitigation responsibilities for disasters and other emergencies, and (4) training. Major staff elements reporting directly to the Agency's leadership were reduced from 12 to 6, thus enhancing span of control. Some overlapping still persists in the national preparedness and state and local programs areas. The Agency leadership is cognizant of this and is continuing to refine functional area responsibilities. As a complement to the functional realignment effort, the Agency leadership is in the process of conducting extensive team building, mission and task identification

and role clarification sessions with key organization personnel to resolve conflicts and affect improved intra-agency cooperation and coordination. A published by-product of the sessions will be a new organization and functions manual. Interviews with Agency representatives determined that the process is a slow but beneficial one. From another perspective, the lengthy period of time that has elapsed since the Agency's inception until the address of the above issues has had a potentially negative impact on the ability of the Agency to fulfill its mission requirements and provide a outwardly visible sign that the Agency can, in fact, do so.

In that FEMA must rely on over 25 different Federal agencies to do the bulk of the emergency preparedness programs design and planning, FEMA faces unusual external span of control problems, which have the potential to limit substantially the effectiveness with the planning and the plans are executed. In light of this, the Agency is attempting to reduce the number of plans developed. The approach being taken is the development of dual or multi-purpose plans that can be applied easily to various emergency scenarios. A key variable in this approach is the success of FEMA in eliminating the parochialism of the parent planning agencies. To this end, FEMA, in conjunction with the Department of Defense and several other agencies, has developed a definitive proposal for an interagency planning mechanism.

The mechanism has three major components: (1) an Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board (EMPB) composed of either the deputy or under secretary of 21 agencies, and chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; (2) an Executive Secretariat, to assist the Board (the Deputy Director of FEMA will serve as the Executive Secretary); and (3) 11 working groups dealing

with such areas as civil defense, industrial mobilization, economic stabilization and public finance, and social services. To ensure the groups retain their impetus, chairmanship is at the assistant secretary level. A more detailed explanation of the Board's composition and responsibilities is at Appendix III. The four essential elements of the EMPB effort are: (1) it focuses on actions, not on studies; (2) the solutions accomplished will provide a basis for action in the full range of emergency situations; (3) the effort is interdepartmental; and (4) the effort involves the active commitment of senior officials, thus giving it both clout and visibility. The Board will be formally activated on December the first, although some of the working groups have already begun their planning process.

As alluded to above, FEMA must rely on over 25 various Federal departments and agencies to not only provide the planning but the technical and operational arms of the civil emergency preparedness effort. Dependent upon the type of emergency being addressed, FEMA must interact with one or more of 30 emergency organizations (Appendix IV) at the Federal level, in addition to State and local governments and numerous volunteer organizations. It is these organizations which control the bulk of the fiscal resources available for the execution of the emergency preparedness responsibilities.

An independent study recommended that "the Congress should be encouraged to provide delegate agency funding sources so that FEMA can stimulate needed research, planning and emergency preparedness without requesting that the Federal departments reprogram existing funding."⁴⁰ After two years, FEMA is still relying extensively on other agencies for funding support. In addition, the Congressional appropriations process requires that FEMA representatives

appear before over 30 Congressional committees in the prosecution of its budget requests.⁴¹ It is difficult to believe that FEMA can be too successful in fulfilling its mission requirements within the current fragmented sphere of public funding.

More important than the organizational aspects of FEMA addressed above, is the continued existence of FEMA itself. During Congressional hearings on the Reorganization Plan of 1958, one of the questions asked by the House Committee on Government Operations was, "Will the transfer of authority under the plan be real or nominal, as far as the President's personal supervision is concerned?"⁴² The recent appointment of a new leadership for FEMA, coincidental with a new Administration, and the designation of the President's Advisor on National Security Affairs to chair the EMPB, suggest that President Reagan is serious concerning his responsibilities in the civil emergency preparedness arena. But will his interest last the course; what will be the position of his successor?

The Nixon decision of 1973 left this Nation without an identifiable or coordinated emergency preparedness planning structure for almost 10 years. The record of his predecessors is not much better. I don't believe the Nation can afford to or should be subject to differing political perspectives in the conduct of the emergency preparedness effort. The mechanisms for a national effort are contained in the Strategic and Critical Stock Piling Act of 1946, the National Security Act of 1947, the Federal Defense Act of 1950, the Defense Production Act of 1950, the Disaster Relief Acts of 1970 and 1974 and the statutes relative to the US Fire Administration and the Federal Insurance Administration, to name but a few. But what of a permanent coordinating agency such as FEMA, one which will continue to have visibility and clout. The answer, in part,

lies in the proposal made by the House Committee on Government Operations that recommended, in 1957, that a new executive department be established, headed by a secretary with Cabinet status. The establishment of such a department by statute would ensure continuity and progress in the national emergency preparedness effort. The rest of the answer lies in the relevance of such an endeavor to the American way of life.

"War related programs grew out of the World War II experience, which brought military devastation to many civilian populations in Europe and Asia, and which underlined the importance of having an economy and an industrial base that could be geared quickly to meeting emergency requirements. The Korean War reinforced the belief in the United States that industrial mobilization planning and preparedness, on a continuing basis, were essential to the Nation's security."⁴³

Since the mid-1950's, the capability of potential adversaries to inflict casualties and damage on the United States has grown, and in the same period likely warning time has shrunk dramatically. These changes, however, have not been accompanied by a growth in attention to war-related civil emergency preparedness measures. The resolution of both the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises without recourse to war gave impetus to this inattention. Further, the potential for total destruction from a nuclear exchange gave fuel to the futurity of energetic action. In the face of such complacency, it has become increasingly difficult politically to acquire support for a national civil defense program.⁴⁴

The opposite trend has characterized reactions to disaster assistance programs. From the Alaskan earthquake in the mid-1960's through the volcanic eruption of St. Helena, Three-Mile Island and the Cuban-Haitian Relocation Program of 1980, both Congress and the people have seen the benefits of well


coordinated and efficiently executed disaster preparedness programs. And there is genuine State and local interest in such programs, especially in areas where actual incidents have occurred.⁴⁵

Meanwhile, increased urbanization of the country, the expanding use of new technologies, an increasing demand on the country's natural resources and the growing interdependence of the world community have resulted in growing vulnerabilities to a wider range of possible emergencies. These include not only war related threats and natural disasters, but such potentialities as terrorism, nuclear reactor incidents, foreign petroleum embargoes, electrical blackouts and large scale industrial accidents.⁴⁶

The creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency records Presidential resolve to create a national capability to deal with major life-threatening emergencies in the United States. The key challenge is to convince the American people that these possibilities exist and that civil emergency preparedness can indeed mitigate their impact on the American way of life. Only then will civil emergency preparedness receive the mandate it deserves.


FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 47

HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION



APPENDIX II

ORGANIZATION FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 48



REGIONAL DIRECTORS

BOSTON	NEW YORK	PHILADELPHIA	ATLANTA	CHICAGO	DALLAS	KANSAS CITY	DENVER	SAN FRANCISCO	SEATTLE
I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X

APPENDIX III

STRUCTURE:

THE EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS BOARD⁴⁹

Chair: The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Membership:

Department of State	Department of Energy
Department of the Treasury	Department of Education
Department of Defense	Office of Management and Budget
Department of Justice	Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Department of Interior	Central Intelligence Agency
Department of Agriculture	Office of Personnel Management
Department of Commerce	Federal Emergency Management Agency
Department of Labor	National Security Council Staff
Department of Health and Human Services	Office of Science and Technology Policy
Department of Housing and Urban Development	Office of Policy Development
Department of Transportation	

Representatives will be at the Deputy/Under Secretary level.

Functions:

- o Formulation of recommendations concerning policy for emergency mobilization preparedness.
- o Development of policy/fiscal guidance documents for working groups and agencies to implement approved policies and plans of action.
- o Resolution of mobilization preparedness issues within the framework of current Administration policy.

Tasks:

- o Formulation for Presidential review, a proposed statement of national policy on emergency mobilization preparedness.
- o Development of a recommended plan of emergency mobilization preparedness improvements consistent with the proposed statement of policy.

WORKING GROUPS

Area

Industrial Mobilization
 Military Mobilization
 Food - Agriculture
 Government Operations
 Emergency Communications
 Economic Stabilization and
 Public Finance
 Law Enforcement and Public Safety
 Civil Defense
 Social Services
 Human Resources
 Health

Agency Chair

Department of Commerce
 Department of Defense
 Department of Agriculture
 Federal Emergency Management Agency
 Department of Defense/Department of
 Commerce
 Department of the Treasury
 Department of Justice
 Federal Emergency Management Agency
 Department of Health and Human Services
 Department of Labor
 Department of Health and Human Services

Membership:

Working Group membership will be determined by each Working Group Chairman, subject to approval of the board. The Chairman of each Working Group will be at the Assistant Secretary level or equivalent. Agency representatives to the Working Groups will be at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level or higher.

Functions:

- o Provide a mechanism for interdepartmental coordination of emergency mobilization policies and plans.
- o Advise the Board on national policy for emergency mobilization preparedness.
- o Advise the Board on activities to be included in the plan of action to improve emergency mobilization preparedness.
- o Assist the Board in monitoring the implementation of guidance on policy and the plan of action.
- o Report to the Board emergency mobilization preparedness measures undertaken by member agencies.

Policy:

Due to the fiscal constraints through FY 83 the Working Groups are to concentrate on the identification of preparedness measures that will enable the government to make more effective use of existing national resources. Therefore the Groups should give attention to the following:

- o Clarification and rationalization of the emergency mobilization roles, responsibilities and authorities of Federal agencies.

- o Improvement in mobilization response procedures.
- o Development of measures to facilitate the smooth transition from routine to emergency operations.
- o Attainment of better coordination between civilian and military mobilization planners.

Initial Tasks:

- o Identify emergency mobilization preparedness activities programmed by agencies in FY 82 and 83.
- o Determine the resources devoted to these activities in FY 82 and 83.
- o Prepare an inventory of legislation/regulations impacting on emergency mobilization capabilities subject to approval of the EMPB.

SECRETARIAT

Chair:

The Secretariat will be chaired by a senior official of FEMA, who will be referred to as the Executive Secretary of the EMPB.

Membership:

Members of the Secretariat will come from FEMA and other Federal agencies represented on the Board (detailees). The Executive Secretary will select the members and determine the proper mix of FEMA and other agency representatives.

Location:

It is planned that the Secretariat will be located in the Old Executive Office Building.

Functions:

- o Provide staff support to the Chairman and members of the EMPB.
- o Coordinate activities of the Working Groups.
- o Provide a liaison between EMPB and the Working Groups.

Designated Emergency Organizations 50

<u>Emergency Organization Name</u>	<u>Department or Agency Responsible for Planning</u>	<u>Function</u>	<u>Authority for Preparedness Planning (and Activation)</u>
Office of Defense Resources	FEMA	Ensure mobilization and national security	E.O. 12148 (Executive Order, Proposed Defense Resources Act)
Emergency Executive Teams	Individual Agencies	Ensure continuation of essential functions	E.O. 11490 (Executive Order)
National Defense Executive Reserve	FEMA, DOC, DOT, DOI, DOL, DOE	Provide reserve of trained civilian executives	E.O. 11179 (FEMA Directive)
Emergency "Federal Register"	CBA	Ensure publication of Executive Branch documents	E.O. 11490 (Executive Order)
Emergency Broadcast System	FCC, FEMA	Provide the President with the capability for nationwide public communication	Communication Act of 1934 E.O. 11490, E.O. 12127
U.S. Emergency Production Agency	DOC	Coordination Production	Section 703 Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 USC 2061
Joint Air Transport Service	FEMA (ODR)	Provide Federal Air Transportation between emergency operating centers	E.O. 12148 (FEMA/ODR Directive)
Economic Stabilization Agency	FEMA (ODR)	Economic Stabilization	E.O. 12148 (FEMA/ODR Directive)
Defense Resources Board	FEMA (ODR)	Advise Director, ODR, on resource management	E.O. 12148 (FEMA/ODR Directive)

<u>Emergency Organization Name</u>	<u>Department or Agency Responsible for Planning</u>	<u>Function</u>	<u>Authority for Preparedness Planning (and Activation)</u>
Wage and Salary Stabilization and Labor Disputes Administration	DOL	Stabilize wages/salaries and maintains effective labor-management relations	E.O. 11490 (FEMA/ODR Directive)
Emergency Employment and Training Administration	DOL	Develops plans and guidance designed to utilize to the maximum extent the civilian workforce resources	E.O. 11490 (FEMA/ODR Directive)
National Labor-Management Mobilization Planning Committee	DOL	Advise Secretary of Labor on workforce mobilization, training and utilization	E.O. 11490 (FEMA/ODR Directive)
Defense Materials System Defense Priorities System	DOC	Control production and distribution of industrial products	DMO-3/E.O. 10480/DPA
Emergency Minerals Administration	DOI	Priorities and allocation of minerals	DMO-3/E.O. 10480/DPA (FEMA/ODR Directive)
Emergency Water Administration	DOI	Priorities and allocation of water	E.O. 11490 (FEMA/ODR Directive)
National Federal Telecommunications Emergency Management Organization	NCS	Regulate use of Federal telecommunication resources	Presidential memorandum of August 21, 1963 E.O. 12046 White House Memorandum of July 5, 1978
Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee	DOC	Advise the President on the management of the government's use of radio frequencies, etc.	E.O. 11490 E.O. 12046 (FEMA/ODR Directive)
Emergency Electric Power Administration	DOE	Coordination and direction of electric industry	E.O. 11490 (FEMA/ODR Directive)

<u>Emergency Organization Name</u>	<u>Department or Agency Responsible for Planning</u>	<u>Function</u>	<u>Authority for Preparedness Planning (and Activation)</u>
Emergency Petroleum and Gas Administration	DOE	Coordinate and direct oil and gas industries	E.O. 11490 (FEMA/ODR Directive)
Emergency Solid Fuels Administration	DOE	Coordinate and direct solid fuel industry	E.O. 11490 (FEMA/ODR Directive)
NATO Civil War-time Agencies	FEMA Coordinates	Support NATO civil war-time activities	Hartman Memorandum
NATO Central Supplies Agency	DOC(OIM)	" " "	North Atlantic Treaty
NATO Defense Shipping Authority	DOC(MARAD)	" " "	North Atlantic Treaty
NATO War-time Oil Agency	DOE	" " "	North Atlantic Treaty
Transportation Emergency Organization	DOT	Provide executive management of the Civil Transportation Resource	Section 4A, Dept. of Transportation Act, (P.L. 89-670), Title 5 U.S.C. Sec. 301 and E.O. 11490. (Executive Order)
National Shipping Authority	DOC(MARAD)	Direct ocean shipping, ship-building and port operations	Merchant Marine Act 1936 (46 USC 1101 et seq.)
USDA Regional Emergency Staffs	USDA	Insure continuation of essential functions	E.O. 11490 (Executive Order)
USDA State and County Emergency Boards	USDA	Insure continuation of essential functions	E.O. 11490 (Executive Order)

<u>Emergency Organization Name</u>	<u>Department or Agency Responsible for Planning</u>	<u>Function</u>	<u>Authority for Preparedness Planning (and Activation)</u>
----- TRANSFERS -----			
Coast Guard to Navy	DOD/DOT	Enhance command and control of U.S. vessels	Inter-agency Agreement
Federal Aviation Administration to Defense	DOD/DOT	Enhance command and control of airspace	Inter-agency Agreement
Federal Supply Service/ GSA to Defense	DOD/GSA	Insure responsive supply support from FSS in an emergency	Inter-agency Agreement

END NOTES

¹Office of Management and Budget, Federal Emergency Preparedness and Response, Historical Survey, President's Reorganization Project, (Washington: February 1978), pp. 1-2.

²"Executive Order 12148, Federal Emergency Management," U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 3 (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 3323 and 3378.

³"National Security Act of 1947," U.S. Code Congressional Service, Laws of the 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 1 (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1948), pp. 502-503.

⁴"Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950," U.S. Code Congressional Service, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 1 (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1950), p. 1262.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 1263.

⁶"Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953," U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 1 (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1953), pp. 878-880.

⁷Office of Management and Budget, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

⁸U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Brief Explanation of the New Civil Defense Bill, by Military Operations Subcommittee, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 1-4.

⁹Office of Management and Budget, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 18.

¹²"Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958," U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 2 (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1958), p. 5598.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 5601.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 5612-5613.

¹⁵"Civil Defense - Federal Assistance," U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 1 (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1958), p. 614.

¹⁶U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Analysis of Civil Defense Reorganization (Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958), 85th Cong., 2d Sess., House Report No. 1874 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 23.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 23-25.

¹⁸"Statement by the President Concerning the Appointment of Frank B. Ellis as Director of Civil Defense and Mobilization," January 23, 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 5.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰"Executive Order 10592," U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 1 (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1961), p. 1321.

²¹Ibid., p. 1320.

²²Ibid., p. 706.

²³Office of Management and Budget, op. cit., p. 33.

²⁴George A. Lincoln, New Dimensions of Civil Emergency Preparedness, Executive Office of the President, Office of Emergency Preparedness (Washington, 1968), p. 4.

²⁵B. Wayne Blanchard, "American Civil Defense 1945-1975: The Evolution of Programs and Policies, Summary 1980," (PhD dissertation, University of Virginia, 1979), p. 15.

²⁶Ibid., p. 17.

²⁷"Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973," U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Vol 2 (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1973), p. 3551.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 3551-3552.

²⁹U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Defense Production, Civil Preparedness Review Part I, Emergency Preparedness and Industrial Mobilization Report, Joint Committee Print, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., February 1977 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. VII.

³⁰Ibid., p. VIII.

³¹Office of Management and Budget, op. cit., pp. 66-67.

³²Ibid., p. 69.

³³Ibid., pp. 69-70.

³⁴U.S., President, 1977-1980 (Carter), Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978: Message, . . . , 95th Cong., 2d Sess., House, Document No. 95-356 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 1-2.

- ³⁵ Ibid., pp. 2-3.
- ³⁶ Ibid., p. 2.
- ³⁷ Leonard Sullivan and W. Scott Payne, Impact of Enhanced Mobilization Potential on Civil Preparedness Planning (Arlington: Systems Planning Corporation, 1979), p. 65.
- ³⁸ Ibid.
- ³⁹ Ibid.
- ⁴⁰ Leonard Sullivan and W. Scott Payne, Conceptual Framework for FEMA Mobilization and Resource Management Research (Arlington: Systems Planning Corporation, 1981), p. 6.
- ⁴¹ Statement by James L. Holton, Chief of Public Affairs, Federal Emergency Management Agency, personal interview, Washington, D.C., November 4, 1981.
- ⁴² Committee on Government Operations, 1958, op. cit., p. 23.
- ⁴³ Office of Management and Budget, op. cit., p. 66.
- ⁴⁴ James L. Holton, op. cit.
- ⁴⁵ Office of Management and Budget, op. cit., p. 67.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid.
- ⁴⁷ Federal Emergency Management Agency, Organization and Functions Manual, Interim July 15, 1979 (Washington), p. 1.
- ⁴⁸ Federal Emergency Management Agency, Headquarters Organization Chart, October 1, 1981 (Washington)
- ⁴⁹ Memorandum from Bennett L. Lewis, Executive Secretary, Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board, October 30, 1981, Attachment 2.
- ⁵⁰ Federal Emergency Management Agency, Designated Emergency Organizations Chart, 1981 (Washington)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Blanchard, B. Wayne. "American Civil Defense 1945-1975: The Evolution of Programs and Policies, Summary 1980." PhD dissertation, University of Virginia, 1979.
- Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board. Memorandum from Bennett L. Lewis, Executive Secretary, to the Chairman, Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board. October 1981.
- Federal Emergency Management Agency. Designated Emergency Organizations Chart. Washington: 1981.
- Federal Emergency Management Agency. Headquarters Organization Chart. October 1, 1981. Washington, 1981.
- Federal Emergency Management Agency. Organization and Functions Manual. Washington: 1979.
- Holton, James L. Personal interview. Washington, D.C. November 4, 1981.
- Lincoln, George A. New Dimensions of Civil Emergency Preparedness. Executive Office of the President, Office of Emergency Preparedness. Washington: 1968.
- Office of Management and Budget. Federal Emergency Preparedness and Response, Historical Survey. President's Reorganization Project. February 1978. Washington: 1978.
- Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy. "Statement by the President Concerning the Appointment of Frank B. Ellis as Director of Civil Defense and Mobilization." January 23, 1961. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962.
- Sullivan, Leonard, and W. Scott Payne. Conceptual Framework for FEMA Mobilization and Resource Management Research. Arlington: Systems Planning Corporation, 1981.
- Sullivan, Leonard, and W. Scott Payne. Impact of Enhanced Mobilization Potential on Civil Preparedness Planning. Arlington: Systems Planning Corporation, 1979.
- United States Code Congressional and Administrative News. 83d Cong., 1st Sess. St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1953. Vol. 1, pp. 878-880: "Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953."
- United States Code Congressional and Administrative News. 85th Cong., 2d Sess. St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1958. Vol. 1, p. 614: "Civil Defense Federal Assistance."
- United States Code Congressional and Administrative News. 85th Cong., 2d Sess., St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1958. Vol. 2, p. 5598: "Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958."

- United States Code Congressional and Administrative News. 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1961. Vol. 1, p. 1321: "Executive Order 10592."
- United States Code Congressional and Administrative News. 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1973. Vol. 2, p. 3551: "Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973."
- United States Code Congressional and Administrative News. 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1979. Vol. 3, pp. 3323 and 3378:
"Executive Order 12148: Federal Emergency Management Agency."
- United States Code Congressional Service. Laws of the 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1948. Vol. 1, pp. 502-503: "National Security Act of 1947."
- United States Code Congressional Service. 81st Cong., 2d Sess. St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1950. Vol. 1, p. 1262: "Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950."
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Analysis of Civil Defense Reorganization (Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958). 85th Cong., 2d Sess., House Report No. 1874. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958.
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Brief Explanation of the New Civil Defense Bill. (by Military Operations Subcommittee)
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957
- U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Defense Productions. Civil Preparedness Review Part I, Emergency Preparedness and Industrial Mobilization Report.
February 1977. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977.
- U.S. President, 1977-1981 (Carter). Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978: Message 95th Cong., 2d Sess., House, Document No. 95-356. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978.

DATE
ILMEI
—8

